The Future of Community Banking by Gaeta, Anthony, Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA
BANKING INSTITUTE
Volume 20 | Issue 1 Article 4
3-1-2016
The Future of Community Banking
Anthony Gaeta Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Banking Institute by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anthony Gaeta Jr., The Future of Community Banking, 20 N.C. Banking Inst. 1 (2016).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol20/iss1/4
THE FUTURE OF COMMUNITY BANKING 
ANTHONY GAETA, JR.* 
I. INTRODUCTION
At the 2015 UNC School of Law Center for Banking and Finance 
Banking Institute (“Institute”), I was asked to share some of my 
observations and insights as to the future of community banking in North 
Carolina.1  Having represented community banks since 1974, primarily 
in North Carolina as well as other southeastern states, and having 
participated in the latest boom of de novo community banks in North 
Carolina that began in the mid-1990s, I based my observations at the 
Institute on my past experiences and I attempted to look into the future.  
It is apparent that my conclusion, which I repeat below, caused some 
amount of disagreement. 
In my conclusion, I stated that “so alas, I see the demise and 
eventual extinguishment of true small town community banks.”  I also 
said that “I hoped I was wrong, as I have been wrong often in the past.”2 
The purpose of this Article is to give further thought to the 
conclusions I expressed at the Institute.  In summary, the factors I 
considered were: 
1. Since the early 1990s until 2009 there were a total of
77 community banks whose deposits were insured by the
FDIC newly chartered in North Carolina by the North
Carolina Commissioner of Banks.3  I am aware of at least
one additional community bank charter issued by the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC); namely, Alamance
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1. Anthony Gaeta, Jr., The Center for Banking and Finance Leadership Award Address
at the University of North Carolina School of Law Center for Banking and Finance’s Annual 
Banking Institute (Mar. 26, 2015) (transcript on file with author). 
2. Id.
3. E-mail from Rowe Campbell, Chief Deputy Commissioner of Banks, N.C. Office of
the Commissioner of Banks, to author (Jan. 12, 2016, 10:53 EST) [hereinafter Campbell E-
mail] (on file with author). 
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National Bank, Graham, North Carolina, which 
subsequently converted from a national charter to a North 
Carolina charter.4 
2. The last community bank chartered in North Carolina
was Coastal Bank & Trust, Jacksonville, North Carolina.
The date of that charter was April 13, 2009.5
3. There have been no banks chartered in North Carolina
since the Coastal Bank & Trust charter, and I am unaware
of any proposals to charter a new bank in the last six to
seven years.
4. Since the early 1990s, the number of banks
headquartered in North Carolina has fallen from 186 in
1992 to 65 as of September 30, 2015.6  This drop in the
number of banks headquartered in North Carolina is a
result of 106 mergers and 7 bank failures.7
II. NORTH CAROLINA COMMUNITY BANK CONSOLIDATION AND THE
STARTUP DROUGHT 
Accordingly, an obvious observation is that the supply of newly-
chartered banks has come to an absolute halt while the number of 
community banks in existence has dwindled precipitously.  It is true that 
we have had cycles like this in the past and, in time, new banks were 
formed in communities where a community bank had been taken over in 
a merger by a larger competitor.  Most of the time, those mergers resulted 
in a premium to the existing community bank shareholders and many 
communities saw the community bank cycle of formation, growth, sale, 
and another new bank formed to fill the community bank void.  I can 
4. United Financial, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Nov. 24, 2004).
5. N.C. COMM’R OF BANKS, NC State Charter Banks and Trust Companies, 
https://www.nccob.org/Online/brts/BanksAndTrusts.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2016).  
Although three other banks have received charters since 2009, they were not startup de novo 
banks.  E-mail from Ray Grace, N.C. Commissioner of Banks, to author (Jan. 11, 2016, 14:39 
EST) (on file with author). 
6.  FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., Institution Directory: North Carolina, 
https://www5.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp. 
7. Campbell E-mail, supra note 3.
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name communities in North Carolina, such as Wilmington, Monroe, 
Dunn, Asheville, Raleigh, Charlotte and Rocky Mount, as just a few 
where this occurred. 
In the past, numerous consolidators were anxious to bid for the 
loans and deposits of successful community banks.  Banks throughout 
North Carolina participated in expansion through acquisition of 
community banks.  These banks included Peoples Bank and Planters 
National Bank in Rocky Mount, Branch Banking and Trust Company 
(“BB&T”) in Wilson, First Citizens Bank in Raleigh, Southern National 
Bank in Lumberton, United Carolina Bancshares in Whiteville, Central 
Carolina Bank in Durham, Triangle Bank in Raleigh, not to mention the 
healthy appetite of some of the larger banks such as NationsBank (then 
NCNB  and now Bank of America), Wachovia (now Wells Fargo), 
Northwestern Bank (now Wells Fargo), and First Union National Bank 
(now Wells Fargo).  In short, in the past there were such a large number 
of “consolidators” that the popular phrase from the movie “Field of 
Dreams” rang true: “If you build it, they will come.”8 
Today, however, many of those consolidators either have been 
consolidated themselves or have become so large, as in the case of Bank 
of America, Wells Fargo, BB&T and First Citizens, that the acquisition 
of a smaller community bank is either not worth the time and expense to 
consummate such a small transaction or the community bank is in a locale 
already served by the expanded banking footprint of the potential 
consolidator.  Consequently, we now have less of a competitive 
environment to acquire community banks.  Lesser demand is 
accompanied by a lower value attached to those banks.  This is simple 
investment banking economics.  There are simply not as many buyers in 
the marketplace.  With fewer buyers, the certainty of the end game or 
“liquidity event” at a handsome or even a reasonable profit, which was 
always anticipated by investors in a startup community bank, is lessened.  
Consequently, community bank startup organizers are finding it much 
more difficult to attract the local investors needed to support a de novo 
bank than they had in the past.  In short, the lack of willing buyers at a 
premium price means a community bank is just not an attractive 
investment, limiting the investment capital available for a de novo 
community bank. 
8. FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal Pictures 1989).
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III. COMMUNITY BANK PROFITABILITY: COMPLIANCE COSTS AND
MARGIN COMPRESSION 
This lack of investment interest is also negatively impacted by the 
regulatory burden imposed on all banks in the wake of the financial crisis 
that commenced in 2008.9  While it is true that many of the Dodd-Frank 
regulatory restrictions only impact banks with more than $10 billion in 
assets, these regulations have trickled down to the smaller community 
banks as “best practices.”  The result is material expense items not seen 
before the 2008 financial crisis.  Outsourcing much of this regulatory 
burden is expensive and self-staffing by the community banks is even 
more impractical from an expense standpoint.  Add to this the heightened 
scrutiny banks face from the federal banking regulators and the increase 
in consumer protection regulation mandated by the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau and many community bankers I have spoken to feel 
that they are being hit by a tsunami of over-reaction and over-protection. 
Community bankers, in the wake of the financial crisis that I 
daresay they had very little to do with, are pleading with their 
Congressional delegations for some regulatory relief to ease the financial 
burdens and cost of compliance being placed upon them.10  But the reality 
is that coming up with an alternative to a “one size fits all” regulatory 
oversight structure that protects the banking public no matter the size of 
bank they choose to bank with is proving to be a difficult task. 
Adding to this expense burden is the lessened profitability of 
many community banks due to the historically low interest rate 
environment.11  Community banks largely make their profit on the spread 
between interest charged on loans and interest paid on deposits.  Very 
few have been successful in developing sources of income from non-
9. See Jeff Bater, Dallas Fed Report Warns of Compliance Costs on Community Banks,
[2016] Banking Daily (BNA) No. 2 (Jan. 5, 2016) (citing a report by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas warning that “more banks may become too small to succeed” due to the 
increased regulatory burden stemming from the Dodd-Frank Act). 
10. See, e.g., Letter from the Am. Bankers Assoc., the Credit Union Nat’l Assoc., the
Indep. Cmty. Bankers Assoc., and the Nat’l Assoc. of Fed. Credit Unions to Richard Shelby, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Dev., Sherrod Brown, Ranking Member, 
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Dev., and Members of the S. Banking Comm. (May
15, 2015), http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/ltr051515.pdf.
11. See generally Janet Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Opening Statement at Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Press Conference (Dec. 16, 2015) (transcript 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/ files/FOMCpresconf20151216.pdf). 
2016] THE FUTURE OF COMMUNITY BANKING 5 
interest activities.  Margin compression is faced by all community banks; 
lack of loan demand for many banks aggravates the issue.  Simply stated, 
community banks are not as profitable today as many were in the past.  
Until interest rates return to more normal levels and until economic 
growth returns with qualified borrowers in need of loans to support their 
growth and expansion, community banks will continue to be challenged. 
With net income flagging, premiums paid on the sale of the bank 
will be adversely impacted as will stock price if the bank is publicly 
traded.  Lagging stock prices make investors impatient, and impatient 
investors put pressure on boards of directors to consider “alternative 
strategic options”—code for “consider selling the bank!”  All of this 
comes down, in my mind, to make attracting investors a significant 
challenge for any de novo bank. 
IV. LOCAL INVESTMENT: ECONOMIC AND REGULATORY HEADWINDS
I have often stated that the startup of a de novo bank is like 
constructing a three-legged stool.  The first leg of the stool requires 
competent executive management.  In the current environment, I see 
sufficient strength in this category to support the formation of a de novo 
community bank.  The second leg of the stool is a viable economic 
community where local investors will show their support by investing in 
and doing business with the de novo bank.  My opinion is that there are 
fewer of those communities in existence now than prior to the crisis, 
which has taken its toll so that the local economy in many communities 
is simply not strong enough to support a de novo community bank.  The 
third leg of the stool is the interest of community members in investing 
in and supporting a startup community bank.  In my opinion, this leg is 
the weakest of the three.  The vast majority of investment in the 
community banks that required recapitalization since the financial crisis 
has come from private equity funds, not from local communities.  The 
lone exception is the First Carolina State Bank, Rocky Mount, North 
Carolina, where a recapitalization took place with all investment coming 
from the local community.12  I know of no other successful community-
based bank recapitalization in North Carolina. 
12. Lee Weisbecker, BioSignia Exec Raises $13M to Help Fund Bank Acquisition,
TRIANGLE BUS. J.: TRIANGLE BIZBLOG (Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/blog/2012/08/biosignia-exec-raises-13m-to-help.html. 
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While private equity is available to invest, private equity is not 
the way to start a bank.  Banking regulators want to see broad-based 
community support, assuming that investors will bring some, if not all, 
of their banking business to their new community bank.  Quite often, a 
heightened community pride arises and local business and civic leaders 
provide business and investment to make the new bank a reality.  Private 
equity can only supply capital and not deposit or loan business.  Further, 
because of the financial crisis, regulators will require far more start-up 
capital for a de novo bank than they required prior to the economic 
downturn.  In a larger city, often the capital required for a new bank pre-
recession was in the $15 million range.  Today, I have been told by 
reliable sources at the bank regulatory level that such a minimum would 
now be closer to $25 million.  Clearly, raising that much additional capital 
is a hurdle organizing groups who may currently be thinking of starting a 
bank must consider. 
V. CONCLUSION
This leads me to the conclusion that, for the foreseeable future, 
and until the economy returns with robust growth, we will not see any de 
novo banks, we will continue to see consolidation of those community 
banks started since the 1990s, and the interest in investing in community 
banks will continue to wane, making the growth of community banks 
difficult indeed.  Without capital accumulation, be it through enhanced 
profitability or capital investment by willing investors, community banks 
will find it hard to thrive and possibly even survive; their only recourse 
may be to sell to a larger competitor at a reasonable price for their 
investors.  My prediction is that many communities that once welcomed 
and supported community banks will continue to decline and the true 
community bank serving local community businesses and local citizens 
will slowly become a relic of the past. 
I hope I am wrong . . .  I have often been in the past! 
